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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: EXAMINING 
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF FOUR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
 BRUCE WYDICK* 
A rancorous debate continues to rage over the use of affirmative action policies 
in college admissions. This paper uses a simple signaling model to evaluate the 
labor market impacts of four types of affirmative action admissions policies.  
Race-based preferential policies and policies guaranteeing admission based on 
high school academic rank may induce discrimination in labor markets when 
there exists strong heterogeneity in socio-economic disadvantage within the 
under-represented minority group.  Under such conditions, it may also be 
difficult to realize ethnic diversity with disadvantage-based preferential policies. 
The paper argues instead for affirmative action policies emphasizing intensive 
college preparation for targeted groups. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy issued executive order number 10925, 
requiring employers contracting with the federal government to "take affirmative action to 
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without 
regard to race, creed, color, or national origin."  Several years after Kennedy's initial executive 
order, colleges also began using affirmative action policies in college admissions, principally 
employing some level of race-based preferential policies.  Most proponents of affirmative action 
on college campuses viewed these as "second-best" policies in the face of both historical and 
present discrimination, but necessary in the short-term to encourage the participation of under-
represented groups in the mainstream economy.  Nevertheless, with the possible exception of 
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abortion, there is hardly an issue that has been as divisive in legal, public, and academic 
discourse as race-based affirmative action in college admissions.   
 Although race-based preferential policies remain strong at many colleges, important court 
decisions have restricted the use of such policies.  The first of these was the Supreme Court's 
famous 1978 Bakke decision, which prohibited the use of quotas in college admissions, but 
allowed race to continue to be used as one of many factors in the consideration of an applicant.  
In the Hopwood vs. Texas court decision of 1996, a federal court barred the University of Texas 
from using race as a factor in college admissions.  The court decision forced the state to consider 
new policies, including the use of high school academic rank as a primary criterion for college 
admission, in order to maintain minority enrollment on its public university campuses. 
 The latter half of the 1990s also saw a number of states politically abandoning race-based 
affirmative action policies.  In 1995, the University of California Regents passed a resolution 
against the use of race-based preferential admissions on all of its nine campuses. California 
voters endorsed this decision the following year by passing state Proposition 209, which banned 
race-based preferential policies in state contracting, hiring, and college admissions.  Patterned 
after Proposition 209, Initiative 200 in the State of Washington ended preferences for minorities 
and women in state employment, public education, and contracting after its passage in the 
November 1998 state election.  In February of 2000, the independently elected cabinet of Florida 
voted to cease considering race and gender as factors in college admissions, a political move 
with solid popular backing within the state.  The popular support behind these initiatives 
suggests that the coalition of interests that had previously supported race-based preferential 
policies may have begun to dissolve.  
 Race-based preferential policies have also come under increasing attack in academic 
circles, although much research has presented policy conclusions that remain solidly in favor of 
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such policies. Leonard (1989, 1990), for example, argues that race-based affirmative action 
policies brought significant gains in employment opportunities for African Americans during the 
1970s, the period just after most affirmative action programs were in place.  Yet the gains for 
African Americans were virtually erased during the 1980s, he notes, when the federal 
government relaxed its enforcement of existing affirmative action policies.  Similarly, Carlson 
and Swartz (1988) find that the wage gap between Hispanic and African-American women and 
white men narrowed dramatically during this period.  More recent work also yields conclusions 
broadly supportive of race-based preferential policies, such as the Bowen and Bok (1998) study 
on affirmative action, The Shape of the River.  Their study, using a 1976 cohort of African-
American college graduates at 28 elite colleges and universities, highlights the substantial 
accomplishments of these college graduates, especially with respect to the large numbers of 
graduates entering professional study in law, business, and medicine.  Particularly significant, 
they note, are the positive externalities of such policies: the rates at which beneficiaries of race-
based affirmative action policies take leadership in civic, youth, and professional organizations 
upon graduation.  
 Nevertheless, race-based preferential policies have become much more openly subject 
to criticism in academic circles from both liberal and conservative scholars.  In his classic work 
The Truly Disadvantaged (1987), William Julius Wilson reflects on the effects of affirmative 
action policies on African Americans. Although Wilson asserts that affirmative action programs 
may represent a welfare-increasing set of policies in the face of severe racial discrimination, he 
maintains that affirmative action programs have successfully fostered a high degree of upward 
economic mobility only for the highest income quintile of African-American households, while 
having little impact on the poorest households.  
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 Conservative African-American scholars Thomas Sowell and Shelby Steele are more 
pointed in their criticism of race-based affirmative action policies.  Sowell (1990) maintains that, 
"because preferential benefits tend to be concentrated on more lucrative or prestigious things, 
they are often within striking distance only for the fortunate few who have already advanced well 
beyond most other members of the preferred group" (1990, p. 156).  Steele (1990, 1998) argues 
that race-based affirmative action policies negatively alter perceptions of targeted groups. Such 
policies, he argues, "mark whites with an exaggerated superiority just as they mark blacks with 
an exaggerated inferiority" (1990, p.120). 
 Welch (1981) and Bound and Freeman (1992) provide a measure of empirical support 
for the assertions of Wilson, Sowell, and Steele.  They show that African-American males with 
high levels of education made dramatic economic advances in the years after affirmative action 
programs were enacted, but that the incomes of African-American males with less education 
regressed relative to those of whites during the same years.  Trejo (1997) finds that, even in the 
presence of affirmative action policies, the wage gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanic white 
males is approximately equal to that between African-American and white males, approximately 
21 percent.  In the case of Hispanics, he attributes this gap primarily to differing levels of 
education, language ability, and work experience.  
 The challenges to race-based preferential admissions policies from court rulings, voter 
initiatives, and academic circles have led to the search for new means of achieving diversity on 
college campuses.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the labor market effects of four 
approaches to affirmative action in college admissions, which represent the four most commonly 
discussed means of achieving diversity on university campuses today.  The analysis presented 
here resembles that of Coate and Loury (1993) in that it uses imperfect information in labor 
market relationships as a basis for its analysis (as distinct from much of the empirical work in 
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this area.)  However, the model presented here is distinct in that it specifically treats the issue of 
affirmative action in the context of college admissions rather than in the labor market itself. 
 The four types of policies analyzed in this paper are a race-based preferential policy, a 
disadvantaged-based preferential policy, a policy heavily weighting high school academic rank, 
and a policy focused on college preparation of targeted groups.  In keeping with much of the 
research in economics in the last twenty years, this paper assumes that agents in the economy are 
rational, but that they are forced to make decisions in the context of imperfect information.  This 
paper uses a simple game-theoretic framework in which individuals use a Bayesian decision-
making process, where decisions are contingent upon observable variables and knowledge of the 
current policy environment.  The paper concludes that it is only under the fourth policy--a policy 
focused on college preparation of targeted groups--that colleges can achieve campus diversity 
without triggering labor market discrimination. 
 
II. A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF FOUR POLICY ALTERNATIVES  
 The tool used in this analysis is a variation on the two-player signaling model pioneered 
by Spence (1974), which has been widely utilized and adapted to analyze labor market behavior 
under imperfect information.1  In the signaling framework, the function of advanced education is 
to act as a screening device for employers in the labor market, rather than to increase the labor 
market productivity of graduates. In such models, an educational degree serves its purpose if it 
produces a Nash equilibrium in which it is only high-ability types (by virtue of their lower 
psychic costs of learning) who are able to fulfill admission and degree requirements. The game 
presented here is a simplified version of that in Wydick (1998).   
 The two players in the game are the “Student” and the "Employer". The Student player is 
a member of an under-represented minority group that the Employer can identify from outward 
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characteristics, such as last name or skin color.  Furthermore, assume that a Student’s type is 
defined over two characteristics.  First, assume that the Student is either "gifted" (g), with 
probability γ , or "mediocre" (m) with probability 1-γ .2  Second, suppose that the Student is 
either "advantaged" (a) with probability α , or "under-privileged" (u), with probability 1-α .  
Thus the Student is one of four different types:  tga, tgu, tma, or tmu with probabilities γα , ( )αγ −1 , 
( )αγ−1 , and ( )( )αγ −− 11  respectively. While the Student knows his or her own type, this 
information is hidden from the Employer. 
 In the initial move of the game, the Student must decide whether or not to obtain a 
college degree.  The student undertakes one of two actions: "College" or "No College".  In the 
model, the costs of completing a college degree vary according to both giftedness and degree of 
disadvantage.  For simplicity, assume that the sum of these costs forms the total "psychic" costs 
(see Spence 1974) of obtaining a college degree, and that any type of student can obtain a 
college degree by incurring these costs.  All else equal, the psychic costs, c, of attending college 
are lower for a tg than for a tm, or cg < cm.  The opportunity cost of the study time required to 
perform adequately in college courses is lower for the gifted type since learning for a tg comes 
quickly.  Moreover, the mental process of synthesizing college material is simply less frustrating 
for the gifted type.  In addition, the psychic costs of attending college are lower for a ta than for a 
tu, or ca < cu.  The environment of the ta (e.g. a supportive family structure, study aids such as a 
home computer, positive peer pressure to succeed) reduce psychic costs relative those of a tu for 
any given level of academic performance.  If students are restricted in their ability to borrow to 
finance their education, the fatigue involved with needing to work to maintain sufficient liquidity 
while studying may pose an additional psychic cost to the tu.   
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 The Employer's strategy consists of a plan of action undertaken in response to each 
possible action by the Student.  The Employer hires for two classes of jobs, offering a job 
applicant either a first-tier position as a "Manager" or a second-tier position as “Mailroom 
Clerk.”  To simplify, the Managerial wage is set at w = 1, and the mailroom wage is normalized 
to zero.  Furthermore, assume that the productivity of all types in the mailroom is equal to some 
ε  slightly greater than zero.  However, q, a worker’s productivity in the Managerial position, is 
greater for the "gifted" type than for the "mediocre" type, and since qg > w > qm, the Employer is 
interested in hiring only "gifted" types for the Managerial position.  
 
A. Nash Equilibrium under Homogeneous Disadvantage Levels 
 The first step of the analysis is to establish the base-line Nash equilibrium under 
conditions of relatively homogeneous disadvantage faced by members of an under-represented 
minority group.  A series of simple numerical simulations using the signaling model will be used 
to illustrate the impact of different types of affirmative action policies on labor market Nash 
equilibria.3  To illustrate the effect of difference in giftedness of students, let us assume, for 
example, that cg = 0.4 and cm = 0.8.  For ca and cu, however, consider two sets of psychic cost 
parameters.  The first set of parameters for ca and cu is intended to reflect conditions of relatively 
homogeneous disadvantage within the under-represented group, say, ca = 0.7 and  cu = 0.8.  This 
set of parameters characterizes an environment of relatively uniform discrimination against all 
members of the group in question. In this environment profit-maximizing employers have no 
"taste" for discrimination (as in Becker, 1957), yet barriers to college entry are very high, even 
for the least disadvantaged of the under-represented group.  
 8 
 A second set of parameters for ca and cu is intended to reflect conditions of heterogeneous 
disadvantage levels within the under-represented group, say, ca = 0.4 and cu = 0.9.  These 
parameters, in contrast, reflect an environment in which a subset of the group in question is 
heavily disadvantaged, perhaps resulting from a protracted period of discrimination. This could 
be due to poor-quality schools, low expectations by teachers, or myriad societal norms working 
against a subset of the under-represented group. 
 Let us first examine the environment of homogeneous disadvantage within the under-
represented group in the absence of affirmative action policies. Under these conditions, a Nash 
equilibrium must be found, in which neither party has an incentive to change an action given the 
actions of the other player.  The employer seeks to maximize profits which, in this model, equal 
worker productivity minus wages.  Thus let us consider a plausible strategy by the Employer of  
(Manager | College , Mailroom Clerk | No College), meaning that the Employer hires the student 
as a Manager if the student has a college degree, and that the Student is hired as Mailroom Clerk 
if he or she has no college degree.   
 The Student seeks to maximize wages minus total psychic costs of education.  Therefore, 
as a first step to finding a Nash equilibrium, one must find the best response of each type of 
Student to the strategy of the Employer.  Given the parameters in our example, psychic costs 
become cga = 1.1, cgu = 1.2, cma = 1.5, and cmu = 1.6.   Since w = 1, the best response to the 
Employer’s strategy is No College for all types of Student.  Does the Employer's original 
strategy constitute a best response to the actions of all types of Student?  Remembering that qg > 
w > qm (hiring a mediocre worker brings a net loss to the Employer), the Employer's strategy 
constitutes a best response provided that the average productivity across all types is less than the 
wage rate, w. (The specific condition is that ( ) 11 <−+ mg qq γγ , or that the average worker 
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productivity of non-college graduates must be less than the managerial wage.)  If this does not 
hold, the Employer will offer the managerial position to a non-college graduate. 
In the resulting Nash equilibrium with homogeneous disadvantage, none of the under-
represented group attend college, and all in the under-represented group are hired as Mailroom 
Clerk.  Furthermore in the resulting Nash equilibrium under heterogeneous disadvantage, only 
tga’s attend college since only cga = 0.8 is less than w = 1. 
 
B. Affirmative Action Policy #1: Race-based Preferential Admissions 
 Consider the labor market effects of a purely race-based preferential admissions policy 
when there is homogeneous disadvantage within the under-represented group.  This type of 
policy effectively "lowers the bar" to college entry and completion for members of the targeted 
group.  In practical terms, this might mean lowering test score and grade-point average 
requirements for admission, as well as providing special classes and tutors for members of the 
targeted group once they arrive on campus.  Together these policies make both college entry and 
graduation less difficult for beneficiaries of the program.  Let the reduction in psychic costs of 
college graduation resulting from preferential admissions policy be equal to R.    
 How would a level of R = 0.15 change the current Nash equilibrium?  With  R = 0.15, 
the psychic costs for each type of Student become cga = 0.95, cgu = 1.05, cma = 1.35, and cmu = 
1.45.  Given an employer strategy of (Manager | College ,  Mailroom Clerk | No College), the 
best response for tga  is to play College, while the best response for all other types is No College.  
Does the original strategy by the employer remain a best response to the actions of each type of 
student?  Yes, provided that the weighted average of the productivities of tgu, tma and  tmu are less 
than w, a condition less restrictive than the previous case. (Specifically, we must have that 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1111 1 <−+−− − mg qq γαγαγ , which simply says that the average productivity in the pool of 
applicants without a college education, now without the gifted tga’s, is less than the managerial 
wage rate.) Thus, in the face of severe racial discrimination, a homogeneous disadvantage faced 
by all types of the under-represented group, a race-based preferential admissions policy can 
potentially result in a Pareto superior Nash equilibrium relative to the absence of race-based 
policy.  Employers and tga’s are better off while non-college graduates are no worse off. (The 
present model, of course, does not consider potential losses for those in the over-represented 
majority group.)  Moreover, if the policy is strengthened to R = 0.25 in the context of 
homogeneous disadvantage within the under-represented group, the conditions necessary for the 
Pareto superior Nash equilibrium become even less restrictive.  In this case the psychic costs for 
each type of Student become cga = 0.85, cgu = 0.95, cma = 1.25, and cmu = 1.35.  Here the optimal 
response to the employer strategy is for both tga  and tgu  to play College, and for tma  and tmu  to 
play No College.  The conditions necessary for the Pareto superior Nash equilibrium are merely 
our basic assumption that qg > w > qm.    
 In contrast, consider a race-based preferential admissions policy implemented in the 
context of heterogeneous disadvantage levels, in which some members of the under-represented 
group have achieved a level of relative affluence, but other members of the under-represented 
group continue to face severe socio-economic disadvantage.  Such an environment may perhaps 
more closely reflect the current experience of African Americans in the United States.  (See 
studies such as Wilson (1987, 1996) which reveal the growing economic divide between African 
American households.) 
 Using the example of R = 0.25, psychic costs are now cga = 0.55, cgu = 1.05, cma = 0.95, 
and  cmu = 1.45.  Here the best response for the Student to the Employer’s original strategy is for 
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types tga  and tma  to play College, and for tgu  and  tmu  to play No College.  But is the original 
strategy of the Employer a best response to the actions undertaken by each type of Student? 
Assuming again that the average productivity across all types is less than w, the optimal strategy 
response by the Employer is to play (Mailroom Clerk | College ,  Mailroom Clerk | No College).  
In response to this strategy change by the Employer, the best response for all types of Student in 
a Nash equilibrium is then to play No College, since no student wishes to bear the psychic costs 
associated with college if a college degree cannot be used to secure the Managerial position.  
Moreover, there is no level of R that is able to generate the Pareto superior outcome in which all 
gifted types obtain the Managerial position unless assumptions about relative productivities of 
types are relaxed substantially or the relative proportion of gifted types, γ , is very high.   
 When there is heterogeneous disadvantage within the under-represented group, the 
entrance of tma’s into the pool lowers the productivity of college graduates from the targeted 
group as R increases.  This example illustrates how, in the context of imperfect information in 
labor markets, it is possible for race-based preferential policies to generate Pareto inferior 
equilibria.  Gifted types fail to reap the returns to their giftedness, employers are unable to 
profitably identify gifted types, and mediocre types are no better off.   
 It is important to note that this model has assumed an exogenously fixed wage. The 
inability of members of targeted groups to secure employment in first-tier labor market positions 
follows from the interaction of race-based preferential admissions policies with a rigid wage 
structure.  If wages are determined endogenously in the model (as in Wydick, 2000), the result is 
a lower equilibrium wage for both college graduates and non-college graduate members of 
targeted groups.  Thus by dampening the signaling power of college degrees held by target 
groups, race-based preferential admissions policies can induce labor market discrimination 
against targeted groups. 
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Real-world policy makers are therefore faced with the following dilemma: a large 
fraction of gifted types are ta's within the over-represented group, but in the under-represented 
group a large fraction of the gifted types are tu's.  Because this makes the relative fraction of tga's 
in the under-represented group small, policies intended to create equal representation among all 
groups at the college level result in the admission of a large number of tma's from the targeted 
group.  The disadvantage level of the tgu's is so great with strongly heterogeneous disadvantage 
levels that it puts them at a competitive disadvantage in the college admissions process with 
respect to the tma's. Upon graduation and entry into the labor market, the disproportionate 
presence of tma's among graduates dilutes the average productivity of graduates in the labor 
market pool from the targeted group.  Employers, unable to distinguish tma's from tg’s because of 
imperfect information, will discriminate against graduates from the targeted group if the average 
productivity of graduates from the targeted group falls below the wage rate, w.   
 Recent empirical studies on earnings differentials in the labor market support the 
existence of discrimination induced by race-based affirmative action.  Gaynor and Durden 
(1995) show that at the time of hiring, white males receive a wage premium over African-
American males, controlling for qualifications and background characteristics, but that this 
differential disappears as years on the job increase, apparently as true productivity is revealed to 
an employer.  Datcher Loury and Garman (1995) find that African-American earnings are much 
more sensitive than white earnings to differences in college grade-point average and choice of 
major. 
 The Bowen and Bok (1998) study presents empirical results from a separate data set that 
appear to reflect the same phenomena as Datcher Loury and Garman.  Among their 1976 cohort 
at 28 elite colleges and universities, mean earnings of white men in 1995 who finished in the top 
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third of their class were $114,900; for African Americans they were actually higher at $115,800 
(though this difference is not statistically significant).  However, among those finishing in the 
bottom third of their class, mean earnings for whites were $83,200, while mean earnings for 
African Americans were $68,500.  Moreover, African-American earnings were also much more 
sensitive to choice of college major.  These results were unaffected after controlling for SAT 
scores, socioeconomic status, type of school attended, and advanced degree held.  
 The empirical evidence in these studies is consistent with the idea that in an environment 
of race-based preferential college admissions policies, the labor market discounts the signaling 
value of college degrees held by college graduates of targeted groups.  The data show that for 
members of targeted groups, employers place a greater weight on other signals such as class 
rank, choice of major, and grade-point average. As might be expected, the labor market appears 
to have adjusted to account for race-based preferential admissions policies. 
 
C. Affirmative Action Policy #2: Disadvantage-based Preferential Admissions 
 As many colleges and university systems have moved away from purely race-based 
preferential college admission policies, they have considered other forms of affirmative action as 
a way of achieving ethnic diversity on campus.  The current evolution in thinking has reflected a 
shift toward disadvantage-based preferential policies.  Disadvantage-based policies can give 
special consideration to any number of disabilities, but primary consideration is normally low 
socio-economic status, a status more common in under-represented minority groups.  
 Although political support for disadvantage-based policies is presumably more broadly 
based, there are significant problems with disadvantage-based policies. The first of these 
problems is related to asymmetric information in the applications process. Despite the problems 
of race-based policies, race, nevertheless, constitutes an easily verifiable claim for preferential 
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treatment.  Claims of disadvantage are much more difficult to verify.  Consequently, asymmetric 
information between admissions committees and college applicants is likely to create an 
incentive for applicants to overstate claims of disadvantage, especially if applicants believe that 
other applicants are overstating their own claims.  Understanding this, admissions committees 
are likely to begin discounting the weight of unverifiable claims of disadvantage presented in 
college applications.  However, a claim of disadvantage that is difficult to verify, such as a 
dysfunctional family, may in truth represent a larger barrier to college entry than a more 
verifiable claim of disadvantage, such as a physical disability.  In this way, problems of 
asymmetric information make disadvantage-based programs difficult to implement, especially if 
claims of disadvantage are strongly weighted in the admissions process. 
 Unfortunately, unless claims of disadvantage are strongly weighted in the admissions 
process, a disadvantage-based policy is unlikely to produce an increase in relative admission 
rates of under-represented groups.  As Bowen and Bok (1998, p.47) note, “(disadvantage-based) 
preferences cannot be substituted for race-based policies if the objective is to enroll a class that is 
both academically excellent and diverse.  While it is true that African-American students are 
much more likely than white students to come from families of low socioeconomic status, there 
are almost six times as many white students as African-American students who come from both 
low socioeconomic status families and have scores that are above the threshold for gaining 
admission to the academically selective college or university.”   
 A simple example illustrates this point.  Again consider heterogeneous disadvantage in 
the under-represented minority group with ca = 0.4, and cu = 0.9.  Assume psychic costs for the 
over-represented majority group to be ca* = 0.4, and cu* = 0.7.  Giftedness and the proportion of 
gifted students are constant across ethnic groups, i.e. cg* = cg = 0.4, cm* = cm = 0.8, and 
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5.0* == γγ ; however, the fraction of advantaged students is higher in the over-represented 
group, 50.0 and ,80.0* == αα . Let the over-represented majority and under-represented 
minority groups make up 80 and 20 percent, respectively, of potential college applicants.   
 In the absence of an affirmative action policy, only tga  and  tga* choose to attend college 
(cga = cga* = 0.8), resulting in a Nash equilibrium in which the best response by employers is a 
strategy of (Manager | College,  Mailroom Clerk | No College) given a sufficiently large 
differential between qg and qm. However, in equilibrium the fraction of college graduates from 
the under-represented group is only 
**8.02.0
2.0
γααγ
αγ
+
 = 0.135.   
 Now consider the effects of a disadvantage-based preferential admissions program in 
which admissions officers possess full information about the relative disadvantage levels of 
applicants.  In this program, tu’s are identified in the admissions process, given preferential 
admissions, and provided access to special classes and tutoring programs once enrolled.  Let the 
reduction in psychic costs of college admission and graduation resulting from the disadvantage-
based preferential policy equal D = 0.15.   
 With D = 0.15, for the under-represented group cga = 0.8, cgu = 1.15, cma = 1.2, and 
cmu = 1.55; for the over-represented minority group cga* = 0.8 , cgu* = 0.95, cma* = 1.2, and 
cmu* =1.35.  Again, given a sufficiently large differential between qg and qm, a Nash equilibrium 
is produced in which (only) tga  , tga*, and tgu* attend college and the employer plays (Manager | 
College ,  Mailroom Clerk | No College).  Yet the disadvantage-based preferential admissions 
policy reduces the fraction of college graduates from the under-represented group from 0.135 to 
*8.02.0
2.0
γαγ
αγ
+
 = 0.111, an equilibrium in which no tgu’s attend college.  
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 The point is that a disadvantage-based preferential admissions policy is unlikely to 
increase ethnic diversity on college campuses if the range of disadvantage level is greater in the 
under-represented group than in the over-represented group.  In our present example, the under-
represented minority group is only able to achieve its proportional representation (of 20 percent) 
when the strength of the disadvantage-based program is increased to D = 0.25.  In practice, 
however, a strong disadvantage-based program is likely to require the admission of a 
prohibitively large number of applicants from the over-represented majority group. Practical 
spatial constraints on university campuses are likely to render such a policy extremely difficult 
and costly under these conditions. Disadvantage-based policies thus constitute a very blunt and 
inefficient policy tool for achieving diversity on college campuses. 
 
D. Affirmative Action Policy #3: Heavy Weighting of High School Academic Rank 
 In order to realize many of the goals of traditional race-based affirmative-action 
programs, some colleges have increased the weighting of high school academic rank in the 
admissions selection process (hereafter an HSAR policy) at the expense of the more traditional 
grade-point average and SAT score.  The University of Texas, for example, now automatically 
grants admission to the top ten percent of the graduating class from each public high school.  In 
February 2000, the state of Florida announced that its public universities will no longer consider 
race in college admissions, and instead will admit the top twenty percent of the graduating class 
from every state high school. The University of California is also currently implementing an 
HSAR admissions policy in which the top four percent of each graduating class would be 
automatically eligible for admission.   
 An HSAR admissions policy implicitly gives preferential admissions to students who 
graduate from high schools where average academic performance is low, such as inner-city 
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schools in which there is a high concentration of students from under-represented minority 
groups.  Weighting high school academic ranking heavily in the admissions process allows a 
college to admit a student who ranks, for example, in the 10th percentile of her class in an inner-
city high school, but who might rank in only the top 30th percentile if she attended a high school 
in a suburban neighborhood.   
 Ironically, an HSAR policy is dependent on the continued segregation of public high 
schools in its efforts to achieve diversity in public universities.  Yet in political terms, an HSAR 
policy may be perceived as fairer than an overtly race-based preferential admissions policy, since 
other commonly used selection processes operate on a similar criterion.  For example, the subset 
of sports teams selected for playoffs are frequently not the teams with the best overall records in 
the entire league, but rather the teams with the best records in their own divisions.  
 To study the labor market effects of an HSAR policy, let us construct an example in 
which a university system offers admission to the top Z percent of the graduating class from each 
high school in the state.  In this example, assume for simplicity that (1) the population of 
students in both inner city and suburban areas is equally divided between tg's and tm's; (2) a 
fraction s of students from an under-represented ethnic group attend high school in the suburbs, 
while  r = (1 - s) attend inner-city high schools; (3) rgaf  equals the fraction of those ranking in 
the top Z percent of their (inner-city) high school class who are tga's from the under-represented 
group, sgaf  equals the fraction of those ranking in the top Z percent of their (suburban) high 
school class in the under-represented group who are tga's, and so forth; (4) in suburban high 
schools, where the proportion of advantaged types is very high, only tga’s are able to rank in the 
top Z percent of a high school class, i.e. 0=== smu
s
ma
s
gu fff ; (5) in inner city high schools, where 
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the proportion of advantaged types is much lower, only tmu’s are unable to rank in the top Z 
percent of the class, i.e. 0=rmuf . 
 How does an HSAR policy affect the quality of college graduates from the under-
represented group in the labor market?  Using Bayes' Rule, one can calculate that 
( )
( )
( )rmargurgasga
r
gu
r
ga
s
ga
g
fffrsf
ffrsf
collegetp
+++
++
= .  What labor market Nash equilibria are likely to be 
generated for plausible values of f ?  First consider a "best-case" scenario in which inner-city 
high schools adeptly identify and prepare gifted types for college, and a large fraction of tga’s 
from the under-represented group living in suburban areas are able to rank near the top of their 
high school class.  In this best-case scenario, rga
r
gu
r
ga fff  and ,,  are relatively large, while 
r
maf is 
relatively small, creating a high probability that a college graduate is a gifted type, even though r 
may be large relative to s for the under-represented group.  Because ( )college gtp  is high under 
this best-case scenario, the Employer is confident that a member of the under-represented group 
is a gifted type.  Therefore under the best-case scenario, an HSAR policy can support a Nash 
equilibrium of (Manager | College ,  Mailroom Clerk | No College) even with loose restrictions 
on the productivity parameters, qg and qm (for example, even when qm is relatively low and 
mistakenly hiring a tm is costly). 
 However, consider the opposite case in which a low fraction of the top Z percent of 
suburban high school classes consist of members of the under-represented group, and degree of 
disadvantage rather than giftedness determines the top Z percent of the graduating class from 
inner-city high schools, i.e. rga
r
gu
r
ga fff  and ,,  are relatively small, and 
r
maf is relatively large.  
Under such conditions ( )college gtp  is low; employers are not confident that college graduates 
from the under-represented group are gifted types. This renders the aforementioned Nash 
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equilibrium possible only under strong restrictions on productivity parameters (e.g. hiring 
mistakes cannot be too costly--qm cannot be too low unless qg is very high). 
 From this example it becomes clear that an HSAR policy is likely to cultivate diversity 
on college campuses without triggering labor market discrimination under the following 
conditions: First, in suburban high schools, gifted students from under-represented minority 
groups must be as likely to finish in the top fraction of a high school class as other gifted 
students.  Second, inner-city high schools must create an environment in which gifted students 
from both affluent and under-privileged backgrounds are able to rank in the top Z percent of their 
graduating class.   In short, for an HSAR policy to be effective, the top fraction of the graduating 
class from inner-city high schools must capture the truly gifted students in the pool, not merely 
the mediocre students whose supportive parents remind them to turn in their homework. (It is 
important to recall here our assumption that “once an m, always an m.”) 
 Unless inner-city schools are able to develop an environment in which tgu's as well as tga's 
can satisfy college admission requirements, an HSAR policy is likely to generate labor market 
discrimination much in the same manner as do more overtly race-based forms of affirmative 
action.  Under an HSAR policy, labor market discrimination will be more severe: 1) the greater 
the disparity in socio-economic disadvantage among members of the under-represented minority 
group; 2) the greater the disparity in academic standards among different high schools; and  3) 
the greater the disparity in productivity between gifted and mediocre types.  
 The point here is the following: Although firms are forced to make decisions under 
imperfect information, firms cannot be systematically "fooled" by soft university admissions 
policies any more than they can be fooled into keeping prices low after a series of inflationary 
increases in the money supply by the Federal Reserve Board.  If employers are rational, free to 
make their own employment decisions, and well-informed of the current policy environment, we 
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must believe that profit-maximizing firms make their hiring and wage decisions contingent on all 
the information available to them about job applicants.  Therefore, it is consistent with profit-
maximizing behavior for employers to statistically discriminate against groups whose signals 
have been dampened by preferential admissions policies if employers can identify such groups 
by outwardly observable characteristics.  This will hold true even with policies that may be more 
widely perceived as relatively “fair”, such as an HSAR admissions policy. 
 
E. Affirmative Action Policy #4: Affirmative Action directed at College Preparation 
 If a wide degree of disadvantage exists within an under-represented group, problems 
with imperfect information dictate that there is no "cost-free" affirmative action policy to 
increase the proportional representation of the under-represented group.  While the popular 
notion is that the cost of affirmative action is borne by non-targeted groups, the argument here is 
that many of these costs are borne by targeted groups in the form of labor market discrimination. 
 An alternative, for which costs are more directly borne by taxpayers instead of targeted 
groups, is a college-preparatory-focused (CPF) policy.  A CPF policy focuses resources on 
college preparation of tgu's within the targeted group. The goal of a CPF policy is to vastly 
increase the presence of well-prepared tgu's from the targeted group in the pool of admissible 
college applicants.  Such programs have recently begun to play a significant role in minority 
recruitment and preparation on many well-known university campuses.  Two current examples 
are the Early Academic Outreach Program (EAOP) at the University of California, and the Post 
Secondary Readiness Enrichment Program at the University of Georgia. 
 The University of California’s EAOP illustrates the range of activities that must be 
undertaken to prepare students from the targeted group for college admission.4  The stated goal 
of EAOP is to significantly increase the number of educationally disadvantaged students who are 
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competitively eligible for admission to the University of California. Because California law now 
prohibits purely race-based forms of affirmative action, EAOP officially defines its targeted 
group as disadvantaged students.  However, the program purposefully focuses its resources on 
relationships with California’s inner-city public schools, therefore capturing a large share of 
African-American and Hispanic students.  The program tries to identify tgu's in their partner 
public schools in the late elementary school years, and then directs resources toward lowering 
the psychic costs of college preparation for these students. The centerpiece of EAOP’s approach 
is a rigorous summer-school program created for targeted students on college campuses, which 
begins as early as the summer after a student's sixth or seventh grade year.  The program offers 
a demanding sequence of classes over the subsequent six summers, emphasizing reading, 
writing, mathematics, and the hard sciences. During the school year EAOP continues some of 
these classes after school and on Saturdays, while simultaneously offering classes in SAT test 
preparation and college counseling.  The results of the program are impressive: In 1999, 63.7 
percent of program graduates enrolled in four-year institutions, while 51.5 percent were eligible 
for admission to the University of California, significantly exceeding the goals for the program 
established by the California legislature of 55 percent and 35 percent, respectively.  
 A critical issue with CPF programs such as EAOP is the selection process of tgu's.  
Selection of tgu's by those in the K-12 system can be done in two ways: The first method of 
selection involves teachers and counselors identifying gifted students for participation in the 
program.  A second method of selection involves teachers and counselors identifying 
under-privileged students who are then offered a college preparation "contract" that only the 
gifted students are likely to accept.   
 The principal problem with the first manner of selection for the CPF program is again 
related to issues of imperfect information: the success of such a program is sensitive to the 
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ability of teachers and counselors to accurately discern who are in fact the gifted students. 
Let mumaguga ffff  and,,,   represent now the fraction of college graduates of the respective types 
from the under-represented group graduating from college after the implementation of a CPF 
program.  The probability then that a college graduate from the under-represented group is a 
gifted type is simply ( )
mumaguga
guga
g
ffff
ff
collegetp
+++
+
=  .  Because α is likely to be small for 
the under-represented group, gaf  is likely to be small.  Since it is likely that muf  is zero (or close 
to zero), the ability of program to successfully achieve diversity on university campuses without 
triggering labor market discrimination hinges on the ability of teachers and counselors to 
accurately distinguish between tgu’s and tma’s.  If guf  is low relative to maf , ( )collegetp g   falls, 
and labor market discrimination against the under-represented group in the context of a CPF 
policy becomes more likely.  In light of this, a battery of tests has emerged in recent years to 
identify tgu’s in the K-12 system.
5 
 A clear policy alternative is for teachers and counselors in the K-12 system to select a 
group of under-privileged students (which may constitute a majority in many public schools) and 
present these students and their families with the option of participating in a demanding college 
preparatory program.  In this way, the process of determining who participates in the CPF 
program operates by self-selection.  This idea, based on the well-known Revelation Principle 
(Myerson, 1983), is to offer a “contract” to all under-privileged students that only tgu’s are 
inclined to accept.  Specifically, a program can be offered to all under-privileged students that 
lowers psychic costs of gaining college admission by P, where the strength of P must lie 
between cgu – w and cmu – w.   This kind of contract could even include stipends for completing 
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successive levels of the program to defray costs of lost part-time work. (It may be helpful to 
think of P in terms of the resources allocated to each student in the preparatory process.)    
 In the context of homogeneous disadvantage within the under-represented group, P must 
therefore lie between 0.2 and 0.6.  Using our parameters reflecting heterogeneous disadvantage, 
a program that will be voluntarily adopted by tgu’s, but not by tmu’s must be characterized 
by P that lies between 0.3 and 0.7.  In the latter example, a CPF program with P greater than 0.7 
will be adopted by both tgu’s and tmu’s, but a program with P less than 0.3 will be refused even by 
tgu’s since the level of assistance in such a program is insufficient to entice the tgu to invest in the 
college preparatory process.  A CPF program can achieve these ends by striking a balance 
between a demanding level of scholarly commitment by students involved in the program, and 
a commitment by teachers and counselors to labor for the success of each individual student.     
 
III. SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
The use of affirmative action in college admissions is one of the most controversial topics 
in higher education.  This paper has employed a simple two-player signaling model to analyze 
the labor market effects of four different types of affirmative action programs that are in use or 
being considered by colleges today: purely race-based preferential admissions, disadvantage-
based preferential admissions, policies that admit based on high school academic rank (HSAR 
policies), and college-preparatory-focused (CPF) policies.  A summary of the findings from the 
analysis can be viewed in Table 1. 
  The paper shows that moderate levels of race-based preferential admissions can benefit 
both employers and gifted members of under-represented minority groups by providing an 
opportunity for these individuals to signal their ability to employers in the labor market.  This is 
more likely where there is a homogeneous level of disadvantage within the under-represented 
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group.  However, if race-based preferential admissions policies are too strong, especially when 
there is strong heterogeneity in the degree of disadvantage within the targeted group, race-based 
policies are likely to generate labor market discrimination against targeted groups.   
 Disadvantage-based preferential admissions are plagued by issues related to asymmetric 
information and verifiability of students’ claims of disadvantage in the college application 
process.  Moreover, disadvantage-based policies may require the admission of an overwhelming 
number of students from over-represented groups to significantly increase the proportional 
representation of under-represented groups. 
 Several major state university systems are shifting from an emphasis on grade-point 
average and SAT score to placing a heavy admissions weighting on high school academic rank.  
When a high degree of racial segregation exists in public schools, an HSAR policy can help 
colleges to reach goals of campus diversity without the official use of race-based preferential 
policies. However, because an HSAR policy functions as a de facto race-based policy, it is 
susceptible to generating labor market discrimination in the same way as do preferential 
admissions policies.  Nevertheless an HSAR policy may be able to avoid inducing labor market 
discrimination if gifted members of the under-represented minority group are able to compete for 
a high academic class ranking on an equal level with other students in affluent areas, and the 
main determinant of relative academic success in inner-city high schools is giftedness rather than 
disadvantage level.   
  If colleges are unwilling to commit significant resources toward the college preparation 
of targeted groups, a trade-off remains between admitting a small number of students from 
under-represented groups, and inducing labor market discrimination against groups targeted by 
preferential admissions policies. A CPF policy focuses specifically on the college preparation of 
gifted, but disadvantaged, students from under-represented groups.  
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The costs of a CPF policy are more conspicuous than the other policies because they 
occur directly within the operating budgets of participating academic institutions, but they are 
likely to be lower than the hidden costs of labor market discrimination.  CPF policies do not 
induce labor market discrimination since program beneficiaries gain acceptance into degree 
programs through standard channels and without the aid of preferential admissions policies.   
The political disadvantage of CPF policies are, nevertheless, that the cost of their 
programs (at least at public universities) are borne directly by taxpayers. Currently the University 
of California spends $60 million in its EAOP outreach and college preparation program for 
students from under-represented minority groups (Los Angeles Times, 7/19/98). Yet even this 
figure (which has doubled since the termination of race-base preferential policies) would have to 
increase substantially for a CPF program to allow college campuses to reflect the ethnic diversity 
of, in this case, the State of California as a whole. CPF policies entail real public expenditures, 
but it is important to understand that they also produce real returns in the labor market for 
program participants, in effect representing a progressive transfer from taxpayers to low-income 
households.   The positive externalities of ethnic diversity in the pool of college graduates as 
documented by the Bowen and Bok (1998) study additionally justify such expenditures. 
 Moreover, the marginal cost of CPF programs may not be as high as one might think. 
Many of the costs of CPF programs are actually sunk costs from the perspective of colleges 
themselves, such as the excess capacity in classrooms and dormitory space that often exists on 
college campuses during the summer months. Furthermore, in staffing CPF programs, schools 
can utilize the domestic pool of graduate students, advanced undergraduates, and former program 
participants, who may also serve as excellent role models for younger students.  For the latter 
reason, it may be true that a public university system may actually have a comparative advantage 
in college preparation for many students relative to their K-12 systems. 
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In concluding, it is important to note that the fundamental insights yielded by the model 
hold even when some of its basic assumptions are relaxed.  In a signaling model, the function of 
higher education is to serve as a screening device for the labor market, yet the policy conclusions 
of the model hold even if education also enhances productivity.  What is critical is that gifted 
types retain a productivity advantage over mediocre types even after graduation.   
Future research in this area should involve a collaboration of economists, political 
scientists, and educational policymakers in the development of affirmative action policies that 
are politically feasible, can be implemented under tight university budgets, and that do not 
induce labor market discrimination.  A specific focal point of this collaboration could be in the 
design of college preparatory programs that are sufficiently rigorous to appeal only to truly gifted 
students, but sufficiently generous that they reach students from even the most severely 
disadvantaged backgrounds.  
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Table 1 
Affirmative Action Policy Comparison 
(cg = 0.4 and cm = 0.8) 
 
 
Type of Program: 
Policy 
Environment: 
Psych. Cost 
Parameters: 
Policy 
Parameters 
tg’s to 
college? 
Labor Market 
Discrimination 
No Affirmative 
Action Policy 
Homogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.7 
cu = 0.8 
R = 0 None _ 
 Heterogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.4 
cu = 0.9 
R = 0 tga only none 
Race-based 
Preferences 
Homogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.7 
cu = 0.8 
R = 0.25 all tg none 
 Heterogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.4 
cu = 0.9 
R = 0.25 ? severe 
Disadvantage-
based Preferences 
Heterogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.4 
cu = 0.9 
D = 0.15 tga only none, but tg  
hard to identify 
 Heterogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.4 
cu = 0.9 
D = 0.25 all tg none, but tg  
hard to identify 
Use High School 
Academic Rank 
Homogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.7 
cu = 0.8 
Admit top Z 
percentile 
city tga 
and tgu? 
probably minimal 
 Heterogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.4 
cu = 0.9 
Admit top Z 
percentile 
city tga 
only ? 
potentially severe 
College Prep. 
Focus 
Homogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.7 
cu = 0.8 
P∈(0.2, 0.6) all tg none if proper 
“contract” offered 
 Heterogeneous 
Disadvantage 
ca = 0.4 
cu = 0.9 
P∈(0.3, 0.7) all tg none if proper 
“contract” offered 
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Footnotes: 
                                                 
* This is a revision of a paper presented at the Western Economic Association International 73rd 
annual conference, Lake Tahoe, June 30, 1998.  The author thanks Vai-Lam Mui, Debra Reed, 
Richard Wydick, seminar participants at Stanford University, and two anonymous referees for 
valuable comments. Wydick: Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of San 
Francisco, California. Phone 415-422-5863, E-mail wydick@usfca.edu. 
1 A significant debate has taken place in the literature since the pioneering work of Spence 
(1973) which focuses on the issue of understanding the positive empirical relationship between 
education and earnings.  Human capital theorists view education as productivity enhancing, 
while others view the educational system as a screening device for the labor market, e.g. MBA’s 
are paid more because only a high-ability type can complete an MBA. 
2 For purposes here, define a “gifted” type as a student who possesses a sufficient combination of 
creativity, learning ability, analytical skill, insight, perseverance, and adaptability that with 
sufficient opportunity and guidance in pre-college preparation, is able to enter and complete a 
rigorous college degree program without the need for special assistance at the college level.   
3 Technically speaking, the Nash equilibria presented in this paper are separating and pooling 
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in which different types of "senders" relay different (or similar) 
messages to a "receiver" in an equilibrium which is also determined by players' updated beliefs. 
However, for simplicity of exposition the present model assumes that players’ actions are always 
consistent with their beliefs. 
4 By 1998-99, the University of California’s Early Academic Opportunity Program had 
developed collaborative relationships with 514 public schools in California that enroll a high 
percentage of students from under-represented groups. This includes 15,960 students in 198 
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junior high/middle schools, and 61,834 students in 316 high schools. Programs include summer 
and Saturday academic training, SAT preparation workshops, and after-school tutoring in 
mathematics, English and science. (For more detailed information about the program, see 
www.EAOP.org.) 
5 There has been a recent proliferation of new tests used to correctly identify tga’s.  These include 
the Bial-Dale College Adaptability Index, based on a novel test involving a Lego block 
construction project, a leadership test, and personal interviews, which the University of Michigan 
and  Pennsylvania State University among others are using to admit some students.  The 
Educational Testing Service now has a "strivers" equation to flag over-achieving, disadvantaged 
students. (WSJ 11/19/1999). 
